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INTRODUCTION
This essay explores various legal implications of recent economic
trends in "emerging capital markets." More specifically, this essay
focuses on the sources of change leading to the creation of emerging
market economies, their impact on global capital markets, and certain
legal ramifications to be considered in this context.
Who actually belongs to the new international club of emerging
capital markets? According to the World Bank, the Big Five emerg-
ing economies are China, India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Russia.' These
* Ms. Rumu Sarkar is an attorney with the Office of the General Counsel,
U.S. Agency for International Development ("USAID") and an Adjunct Law Pro-
fessor at the Georgetown University Law Center ("GULC"). The views expressed
herein are the author's personal views and do not necessarily reflect the policies or
views of USAID, the United States Government, or GULC.
1. See Richard Stevenson, World Bank Report Sees Era of Emerging Econo-
mies: New Giants Include Brazil, India and Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1997, at
D7 (discussing the World Bank's prediction that these countries will become eco-
nomic powerhouses in the next quarter century); Robert Chote & Mark Suzman,
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countries have made a critical transition, at least in the eyes of West-
ern commentators and observers that will fundamentally alter their
course in the next decade. Indeed, the World Bank estimates that by
2020 these five countries will double their exports, capturing up to
16.1 percent of total world output.'
The transition from a "developing" country to an "emerging capi-
tal market" is a new and extremely important concept. This transition
reflects an overall change in the general view of development.
Emerging market economies are now perceived by the international
community as offering a wealth of opportunities in trade, technology
transfers, and foreign direct investment ("FDI"). Emerging capital
markets also offer the foreign portfolio investor the potential for
profit. Moreover-although most of these economies are located in
the "developing" world (e.g., Brazil, Mexico, India, and Indonesia)-
investing in these economies is no longer associated with the tradi-
tional notion of providing "development assistance" is provided to
poorer nations. Today, "foreign investment" is increasingly replacing
"foreign assistance."
The preferential trade relations of the past, particularly between
the developing world and the industrialized world, have broken down
during the past decade. Trade relations and capital investments are
now being "rationalized" in a new international economic order that
does not conform to post-colonialist relations of the past. Capital,
technology, and trade now flow toward new market opportunities
wherever they may lie. For perhaps the first time in history, the
playing field is level enough to allow anyone to obtain any commod-
ity, product, or service from virtually anywhere by anyone.
Global market integration is a reality, best exemplified by the
Internet. An unknown concept a decade ago, the Internet is now an
indispensable tool used by millions of people across the globe, many
of whom live in the developing world. These relatively new cross-
Developing Economies Gain Pace, FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 10, 1997, at Al (noting that
developing countries are set to double their share of global output in the next
twenty-five years); see also Troy Flint, Yale Dean Sees Balance of Power Chang-
ing, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 31, 1997, at 1 (declaring the rising stars to be Brazil,
China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey).
See generally JEFFREY GARTEN, THE BIG TEN: THE BIG EMERGING MARKETS AND
How THEY WILL CHANGE OUR LivEs (1997).
2. See Stevenson, supra note 1, at D7.
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border exchanges are intensely liberating and have resulted in an ex-
plosion of information about emerging market economies. As a re-
sult, private actors in the industrialized world have expanded their
entrepreneurial interests and forged new connections with the devel-
oping world. Thus, private entrepreneurs and investors have entered
the development scene on an unprecedented scale. The movement
toward more liberalized capital and technology flows is dramatic.
There are two potential causes for this occurrence. First, the failure
of state-led economic intervention to produce sustainable develop-
ment results is key in the developing world. Second, the developing
world's desperate need for capital to finance development has led to
large-scale public borrowing from commercial and multilateral
banking sources. Commercial lending to sovereign borrowers, how-
ever, not only failed to yield concrete development results, but also
created a crushing debt burden for many developing nations. Debt
servicing drained developing countries of their foreign exchange re-
serves and depleted the available capital for investment in their own
industries and capital infrastructure.
In light of these past strategic failures, many emerging capital
economies have critically reexamined the role of the state in encour-
aging sustained economic growth. State interventionist policies of
the past are being abandoned in favor of retrenching the public sector
through privatization. Additionally, the popularity of sovereign bor-
rowing, while still an important source of international development
financing, is waning. Developing nations now seek equity and bond
financing from international money markets on a much more ex-
panded scale. These trends have several important implications worth
exploring.
I. THE FAILURE OF STATE-LED ECONOMIC
INTERVENTION
Following independence, many newly formed nations in Africa,
Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America seemed to hold promise of
self-sufficiency and economic empowerment. This promise in many
cases, however, was never really fulfilled. Many nations, including
Brazil, India, Mexico, and Tanzania, adopted protectionist policies to
shield their markets from outside access and thereby gain self-
sufficiency. The idea was to protect newly formed indigenous indus-
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tries from collapse due to the competitive pressures of imports from
more advanced industrialized nations. By capturing domestic mar-
kets, developing countries hoped that their local industries would
form a broad industrial base and enable them to compete successfully
in international markets.
Unfortunately, import substitution policies produced a number of
serious consequences over time. First, by trying to serve their do-
mestic markets exclusively, these developing countries failed to build
up export industries that would have added badly needed foreign ex-
change to their treasury reserves. These countries also propped up
selected industries through government subsidies, further protecting
these industries from competitive market pressures. Their nascent in-
dustries, therefore, had no incentive to manufacture products that
would be competitive on the international market. In the long run,
these policies failed and did not bring about a dynamic, fast-paced
economy that was originally envisioned. In fact, quite the contrary
occurred in most cases as many of these developing countries experi-
enced negative economic growth and increasing poverty. Thus, the
intervention of the state in the productive sectors of the economy,
whether agriculture, heavy industry, or light manufacturing did not
seem to work.
The idea of state-led economic growth also has not worked well in
the planned economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the planned
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia literally imploded,
collapsing from their own weight. The heavily state-subsidized in-
dustries gradually went bankrupt, as did idea of the Soviet-style
State. Now the "transitional economies" of the former Soviet bloc are
scrambling to restructure their economies along market-oriented
lines. In addition, these countries have completely overhauled their
systems of governance by adopting more democratic and representa-
tive forms of government.
Thus, we have seen a subtle (as in the cases of developing coun-
tries that followed import substitution and other protectionist poli-
cies) and a not so subtle (as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union) indictment of the state's ability to deliver the promise of de-
velopment. In response, the role of the state is dramatically shifting
in the developing world. Many states, particularly emerging capital
[13:705
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markets, are moving away from taking charge of the economy to fa-
cilitating economic growth along open market lines.
I. THE NEED FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The developing world's nearly desperate need for capital to fi-
nance development has fueled the second principal cause underlying
the transition from dependency to global interdependency. It is clear
that enormous capital flows are necessary to restructure and mod-
ernize the economies of the developing world, whether through the
building of modem roads, airports, and seaports; setting up telecom-
munications networks; or generating the power necessary to support
industrial and consumer needs. State-owned enterprises are usually
hopelessly undercapitalized and badly managed. Moreover, the past
track records of many developing states demonstrate their inability to
design, finance, or operate the capital infrastructure necessary to
support modem economic growth.
In the past, developing countries have borrowed from commercial
banks to finance their fledgling industries and to meet their import
needs. Such borrowing, however, led to severe economic imbalances
and political consequences, such as seen in Latin America. The
Mexican fiscal crisis is a compelling example of this situation. Be-
ginning in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the
"World Bank") urged Mexico to abandon its strategy of import sub-
stitution and dismantle its trade barriers to imported goods. The IMF
urged the Mexican Government to decrease its heavy dependence on
commercial loans and, instead, adopt a program of aggressive trade
liberalization and industrialization primarily aimed at attracting hard
currency through foreign investment.'
Once the industrialization boom began to fade in 1982, however,
Mexico started borrowing heavily from commercial banks in indus-
trialized countries which were then saturated with petrodollar depos-
its from the Middle East. At the time, lending to Mexico was an at-
tractive option for commercial banks because Mexico is an oil
3. See William Lovett, Lessons from the Recent Peso Crisis in MAeico, 4 TuL.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 148 (1996) (discussing the implications of the Mexican
foreign exchange and devaluation crises and the U.S.-I.M.F. bailout package).
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exporting country whose oil revenues could be easily collateralized.
By the mid to late 1980s, Mexico's debt crisis became apparent.
Even though Mexico followed harsh economic prescriptions of
eliminating tax subsidies and import tariffs, cutting public expendi-
tures by reducing government salaries, and instituting an aggressive
privatization program, inflation continued to grow.' Frequent cur-
rency devaluations and the continuing debt obligations being serv-
iced by the Government of Mexico, including the repayment of teso-
bonos (i.e., government-issued bonds tied to the U.S. dollar but
repayable in Mexican pesos), added to the inflationary pressures on
the economy.5 Over forty percent of Mexico's population slipped
below the poverty line.6
What was the human cost of the Mexican fiscal crisis? Devalua-
tion and high interest rates caused hyperinflationary conditions that,
in turn, led to a recession.7 Lost jobs during the austerity period over
the past two years, foreclosed mortgages, and a sharply increased
trade deficit were some of the results of the fiscal crisis. Moreover,
Mexico's capital market lacked the depth and the strength to survive
a liquidity crisis of this magnitude. In hindsight, it is easy to say that
the Mexican economy should have moved toward long-term invest-
ment rather than relying so heavily on volatile short-term financial
instruments (such as tesobonos) for financing. Further, it can be ar-
gued that the IMF should have worked more closely with the Mexi-
can government to correct trade and economic imbalances before
reaching a crisis point, and installed social safety nets to protect the
poor.
Unfortunately, Mexico did not have the benefit of hindsight. Faced
with the imminent collapse of the economy due to a possible gov-
ernment default on the payment of outstanding tesobonos, the Mexi-
can government received a cash infusion of $50.8 billion in 1995
4. See Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational In-
vestment and Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Af-
termath of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L., 539, 558
(1996) (discussing Mexico's economic strategy in the 1990s).
5. See id at 562-63 & n.132.
6. See id. at 565.
7. See Paul Lewis, For Asia, Austerity and Exports: Seeing Mexican Parallel,
Economists Stress Market Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1997, at D3 (noting a 6.2
percent contraction in Mexico's economic growth in 1995).
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consisting of the following: (1) $20 billion in loans and loan guaran-
tees from the United States (collateralized by oil revenues generated
by Petroleos Mexicanos, the state-owned oil refinery), (2) $17.8 bil-
lion from the IMF, (3) $10 billion from the Bank of International
Settlements, (4) $2 billion from Canada and Latin American nations,
and (5) $3 billion from commercial banks.8
Despite Mexico's fiscal crisis, certain sectors-e.g., mining,
power generation, and service industries-experienced growth rates
of over 5.5 percent in 1996, and the economy rose over 4.4 percent
for the first nine months of 1996 as compared to the same period in
1995.' Mexico also paid back $1.5 billion of the $13.4 billion it bor-
rowed from the IMF." Most importantly, however, on January 16,
1997, at a signing ceremony at the White House, the Mexican Gov-
ernment repaid the $13.5 billion it owed to the United States three
years ahead of schedule." Paying off its loan led to a rally in stock
and bond markets in Mexico, especially since Mexico's oil revenues
were no longer being used to collateralize this debt obligation. 2
Mexico refinanced its high interest loans from the United States
with Mexican-issued bonds with fairly high interest rates. Sales of
these bonds to European, Asian, and American capital markets al-
lowed Mexico to pay off its debt ahead of schedule. These new
bonds will save Mexico about $100 million per year in interest pay-
ments otherwise payable to the U.S. Treasury. In addition, U.S.
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin reported that the Treasury made a
$580 million profit on the United States loan to Mexico. 3
8. See Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 4, at 568.
9. See Mexican Output Rises 7.4%, Eclipsing Economic Forecasts, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22, 1996, at D4.
10. See David Wessel & Craig Torres, Mexico Will Close Out Its Debt to U.S.:
Early Repayment Marks Both Livelier Economy, Access to Bond Markets, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 16, 1997, at A10 (discussing how Mexico replaced its short-term loans
with medium-term borrowing to repay the loan).
11. See id
12. See Patricia Wertman, The Mexican Support Package: A Survey and
Analysis, 5 No. 9 MEX. TRADE & L. REP. 19 (Sept. 1995) (discussing the safe-
guard mechanisms of the U.S. rescue package to Mexico, including the oil pro-
ceeds facility). Proceeds of oil exports from Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX") and
its two subsidiaries, PMI Comercio Internacional S.A. de C.V. and PMI Trading
Ltd., were deposited into a special account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. See id
13. See Wessel & Torres, supra note 10, at A10.
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The developing world's experiment with sovereign borrowing
from bilateral creditors (e.g., the governments of Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") members such
as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States),
and multilateral banking sources (e.g., the IMF and the World Bank),
has also been less than satisfactory. Peru, for example, was a heavy
borrower from bilateral creditors such as Canada, Finland, Germany,
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. These sover-
eign creditors recently forgave about $275 million of Peruvian debt
owed to them. 4 Unfortunately, this amount is still less than one per-
cent of Peru's overall debt of nearly $30 billion."5
In 1985, President Garcia decided to limit debt servicing to not
more than ten percent of total export earnings, ultimately defaulting
on World Bank and IMF loans, which cut off further credit for
Peru. 16 Peru's debt crisis continued to deepen, and by 1993, debt
service payments amounted to 63.7 percent of Peru's export earn-
ings. 7 In fact, heavy-handed borrowing from the World Bank led
Peru to seek bridge loans from the United States and Japan in order
to meet its over $1 billion in arrears to the IMF and the World
Bank.18
Beginning with the presidency of Alberto Fujimori, Peru engaged
in an aggressive program for sovereign debt buy-backs of its own
debt to reduce up to $1.4 billion of its overall external debt obliga-
tions.1 9 Peru also successfully managed to convert about $10 billion
in commercial bank debt into Brady bonds, reducing commercial
debt service payments to less than $350 million from previous levels
of $600 million a year.20
Peru also began an ambitious privatization program whereby in
14. See Richard Lapper, Survey of Peru: So Much Owed to So Many; The
Country's Past Failure to Service its Debt has Marred Its Relationship with





18. See Steven A. Holmes, U.S. Seeing Progress, Acts to Restart Peru Aid,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1993, at A4.




February 1992 it began to divest its interest in 220 state-owned busi-
nesses.21 Peru formed a privatization fund in 1994 to manage the pri-
vatization process with Banco de Credito del Peru, Chase Manhattan
Bank (U.S.), and Midland Bank (U.K.) acting as the initial inves-
tors. Penu met all of the IMF's macro-economic targets in 1996, and
is now devoting over $940 million from its government revenue gen-
erated by privatization toward social safety net issues and capital in-
frastructure growth.'
As these examples illustrate, attempting to fuel the development
process by borrowing from commercial or multilateral banks has not
been altogether successful. In fact, the macro-economic imbalances
resulting from the heavy debt overload incurred by developing coun-
tries, have, in most cases, led to the intervention of the IMF. The
IMF's imposition of structural adjustment programs and austerity
measures has caused a great deal of disequilibrium in developing so-
cieties and, in some cases, made the promise of development even
more elusive.
In light of the uneven results of using sovereign borrowing from
international creditors as a strategy for development, many develop-
ing countries have curtailed sovereign borrowing from commercial
and multilateral sources and have begun to rely on equity investment
as a means of encouraging economic growth.24 Developing countries
21. Arthur Golden, Miracle in Peru: Major Surgery Transforms Country From
Economic Basket Case to International Superstar, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July,
30, 1995, at I-1.
22. Stephen Fidler, Fund Launched to Invest in Peru Privatization, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1994, at 30 (reporting that the fund's sponsors hoped to raise $250 mil-
lion in cash and sovereign debt paper).
23. James Craig, Peru Publishes Details of 1995 Economic Goals, REUTERS
Bus. REP., July, 2, 1995, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Non-US File.
24. The World Bank is currently questioning its continued relevance in a post-
Cold War era as a lender to its sovereign members. Now that global capital mar-
kets are more integrated and international capital is highly mobile, the role of the
World Bank is being redefined. Should the World Bank support "non-emerging
markets" through its lending policies, move away from lending altogether and
concentrate on loan guarantees, or find other means of facilitating private invest-
ments? In time, the World Bank's function may diminish in scope, which may ul-
timately lead to an expansion of the roles of the International Finance Corporation
("IFC") and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), two or-
ganizations that provide private sector-related financing and political risk insur-
ance, respectively.
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are now trying to attract equity investment from private investors
who will become their partners in development, if only for the sole
purpose of protecting their investment. International equity invest-
ment-rather than public sector borrowing-has emerged as the new
road to development. As a result, open access to international finance
markets has become increasingly important to both developing and
transitional economies.
The impact of this policy shift has been expressed in very dramatic
terms. In 1990, official development assistance in the form of bilat-
eral aid primarily from OECD countries amounted to nearly $65 bil-
lion, whereas private investment in developing countries was less
than half that amount, totaling about $30 billion." Last year, official
development assistance slipped to $45 billion, but private investment
burgeoned to approximately $245 billion.16 The tables of public and
private finance in the developing world have turned.
The IMF estimates that FDI is the biggest component of private
investment in Asian, Latin American, and Eastern European coun-
tries, rising to $100 billion in 1996, from $48.8 billion in 1993.27 In
comparison, net portfolio investment in these economies was a mod-
est $43.2 billion in 1996.28 The foreign sources of finance seemed in-
exhaustible for emerging market economies benefiting from the tidal
wave of foreign investment in their economies, until the balloon
25. See David Sanger, Asia's Economic Tigers Growl at World Monetary
Conference: Say Opening of Markets Hands Wall Street Too Much Power, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1997, at Al.
26. See id. (noting the significant change in the source of funds). A study enti-
tled, "The Reality of Aid," based on economic figures of the 21 members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") which was
released in the United States by Interaction, a Washington-based organization, re-
ported that official aid from OECD countries fell to $55.8 billion in 1996, a drop
of $3.8 billion. According to this study, Japan reduced its official aid by 15 percent
between 1995-96, and the United States had the lowest ratio of foreign assistance
of all OECD countries. Further, the study found that private aid donations in-
creased spectacularly from $80 billion to $234 billion in 1996. Thus, privately
funded assistance furnished to developing countries was four times greater than
that provided by official government sources.
27. See Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Distant Echoes: Asian Woes Will Take a Toll on
Economies Around the World, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 31, 1997, at I (reporting
that the developing world worries that the Asian economic crisis will affect it
through an overall decline in direct investment).




burst in late 1997.
The first black cloud on the horizon materialized on July 2, 1997,
when Thailand severed the link of its local currency, the baht, to a
basket of hard currencies. 9 The baht went into a free fall, not unlike
the Mexican peso devaluation in December 1994.
When the dollar rose earlier this year, Southeast Asian "tigers"
were forced to increase their interest rates.3" Most of the Southeast
Asian economies fought valiantly to defend their currencies, but se-
rious competition from China and shrinking export markets for their
goods forced a devaluation of their currencies in order to lower the
cost of production for exports.3 As a result, the short-term borrowing
binge from 1993 to 1996 to finance long-term investments in real
estate and other non-export sectors32 became a financial crisis in the
making. Rental income from real estate ventures, for example, was
earned in local currency, but dollar denominated loans in support of
these investments had to be repaid in hard currency by converting
devalued currencies.33
Beleaguered by currency crises stemming from a variety of com-
plex reasons, the Hong Kong, Indonesian, Malaysian, Philippine,
Singaporean, South Korean, and Thai stock markets began collapsing
like a house of cards, necessitating emergency bail-out packages for
Thailand ($17.2 billion), Indonesia ($22 billion), and South Korea
($20 billion).34 Over time, the IMF bail-out package for Indonesia
29. See Many Asian Stock Markets Fall Sharply: Currencies Also Lower;
Trading-Rule Change by Malaysia Faulted, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1997, at C2 (re-
porting that the developing world worries that the Asian economic crisis will affect
it through an overall decline in direct investment).
30. See The Asian Miracle: Is It Over?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 1, 1997 (discussing
the historic growth of the Asian "tigers," economies which have gained a remark-
able amount of strength in the last thirty years). Originally, the Asian tigers in-
cluded Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Now, the group includes
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand as well. See also Jeffrey D. Sachs,
Asia's Miracle is Alive and Well: Despite Currency Jitters, the Region's Econo-
mies Will Keep on Booming, TIME, Sept. 29, 1997, at 36.
31. See Jeffrey Sachs, The Wrong Medicine for Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1997, at A23 (arguing that the IMF must take a different approach to the Asian cri-
sis).
32. See id (describing the trends that set up the conditions for the crisis).
33. See id (detailing the dilemma the Asian investors faced).
34. See Art Pine, Unsettled Markets: US. to Join the IMF Rescue of Indonesia
Asia: Its $3 Billion Contribution is Part of a $22-Billion Contingency Package,
1998]
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soared to $40 billion.35 Ultimately, the IMF bail-out package for Ko-
rea ballooned to over $57 billion, $24 billion of which has been
guaranteed by the South Korean Government.36 International inves-
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1997, at DI (reporting that most of the funds for the Indone-
sia bailout will come from a billion dollar loan from the IMF and a six to eight bil-
lion dollar loan from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank); see also
John Burton, Korean Pride Battered by Plea for $20bn IMF Rescue, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1997, at 3 (noting that some analysts wonder if the amount requested will
be enough to help South Korea through the immediate crisis).
35. See, e.g., Seth Mydans, Indonesian Currency Declines on Uncertainty Over
Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26 1998, at A6 (reporting the Indonesian currency de-
cline and the $40 billion IMF bailout package offered in exchange for economic
reforms); Seth Mydans, Indonesian Currency Falls Hard, Clouding Recovery,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1998, at C1 (reporting the "fears that [the] $40 billion rescue
package organized by the IMF would be inadequate"); David Sanger, Indonesian
Leader Yielding to Pleas to Mend Economy, Series of Official Visits; Suharto As-
sures 1MF. He Will Observe Terms of a Bailout-Skepticism Perisists, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1998, at Al (reporting that Indonesia must comply with the re-
quirements of the $40 billion IMF fund bailout).
Indeed, as a response to IMF prescriptions for economic recovery, Indonesia has
been attempting to shore up its banking industry and improve its overall financial
sector by announcing the merger of five private banks as the start of a consolida-
tion of over 240 banks nation-wide. See Seth Mydans, Indonesia Begins the Res-
cue and Consolidation of Banks: 5 To Merge in Spirit of the .MF. Accord, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 20, 1998, at D3. Moreover, the Indonesian Ministry of Finance an-
nounced a new package of reforms aimed at strengthening the banking sector by
guaranteeing bank deposits, eliminating restrictions on the foreign ownership of
banks, and creating a special agency to oversee the rehabilitation of banks to be
merged or liquidated. See Seth Mydans, Indonesia Introduces Key Banking
Changes: Guarantees on Deposits and an End to Limits On Foreign Ownership,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1998, at D7.
36. See, e.g., Timothy L. O'Brien, Banks in Accord to Extend $24 Billion in
Korea Loans: Government to Guarantee Debt for Up to 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
29, 1998, at Al; Stephanie Strom, 2 South Korea Companies Respond to Eco-
nomic Crisis: Plans Conform to Several IMF. Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1998, at D2; Kim Yong Geun, Korea's Expensive Life Raft, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20,
1998, at A23.
Further, the IMF advocates high interest rates and fiscal austerity for Korea in
order to restore confidence in the Korean monetary system and reverse the depre-
ciation of its currency. See Peter Passell, Economic Scene: South Korea is Facing
Some Difficult Choices, N.Y.TIMES, Dec. 18, 1997, at D2. These proposed auster-
ity measures have been criticized already by Jeffrey Sachs, Director of the Harvard
Institute for International Development, as restricting consumption and investment
rather than focusing on restructuring Korea's industrial and financial sectors. See
id. This view is echoed by Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist of the World Bank. He
argues that in light of the fact that Asian nations have high savings rates, high pro-
ductivity, and a strong work ethic, such nations should not be treated in the same
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tors panicked at the collapsing stock market prices in Southeast Asia
and withdrew $1.4 billion from international equity funds in two
days alone in October 1997."7 This amount represents about 4 percent
of the total $380 billion held by such international funds.3 8 Further,
the sovereign debt of Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea was down-
graded to "junk" status, seriously affecting their ability to raise capi-
tal in international markets, thus forcing them from being an "eco-
nomic darling to financial pariah in a breathtakingly short period."'3 9
A detailed analysis of the complexities of the Southeast Asian
currency crises is outside the scope of this essay. However, the
temptation of grouping all East Asian countries into a generic finan-
cial melt-down should be avoided. The recent currency crisis which
first affected Thailand in the summer of 1997, and whose contagion
later affected Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, the Philippines, and
others has an underlying complexity that is fact-specific to each case.
To establish a better conceptual grasp of the situation, it may be use-
ful to rely on Fred Bergsten, Director of the Institute for International
Economics, who has grouped East Asian countries affected by the
recent crisis into three separate categories: the Northeast Asians (Ja-
pan and Korea, which have major financial structural problems); the
Southeast Asians (Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malay-
sia, which have large external deficits and fragile financial sectors);
and the Strong Center (China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore,
which have large trade surpluses and foreign exchange reserves)."
fashion as classically mismanaged "third world" economies, and warns that strict
economic measures may trigger a recession. See Peter Passell, Economic Scene:
Critics: The LMF. is Misguided Skeptics: Too Much Rot in Asia, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 1998, at D2.
37. See Tim Smart, Money Flowing Out of Global Mutual Funds, WASH. POST,
Oct. 31, 1997, at G1; see also Steven Pearlstein, At Economic Summit on Asia, A
Search for the 'Right' Policy, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1997, at G1.
38. See id
39. Timothy O'Brien, Debt Ratings of 3 Nations in Asia Cut: 'Junk' Status for
Korea, Thailand and Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1997, at D1.
40. See Asian Monetary Crisis, Proposed Remedies: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. (Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of C.
Fred Bergsen, Dir., Inst. for Int'l Econ.) [hereinafter Bergsten] (documenting case
studies of Korea and Indoensia). See generally Vinod Thomas & Peter Stephens,
The East Asian Economic Miracle, in THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK:
HELPING MEET THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPMENT 4-11 (K. Sarwar Lateef ed.,
1995).
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Further, Mr. Bergsten traces the origins of the crisis to the de-
valuation of the Chinese currency by about forty percent in 1994, and
the depreciation of the Japanese yen by over twenty-five percent be-
ginning in 1995. 4' The drop in value of the two major currencies in
the region put tremendous pressure on the trade positions of the
countries which were later affected by the currency crises, produced
large external deficits, and precipitated the collapse of internally
weak financial sectors in these nations.
Fortunately, these East Asian markets rebounded after months of
tottering on the brink of financial collapse, giving renewed interna-
tional confidence in the ability of these emerging markets to recover
from the worst of the economic panic of the past several months.4"
The IMF may have played a pivotal role in stabilizing these econo-
mies by making immediate hard currency infusions available to these
nations and by imposing a strict agenda of fiscal disciplinary meas-
ures: history will be the judge.43 Yet, even at this preliminary stage, it
is becoming clear that the close cooperation between government,
industry, and long-term investment planning for critical sectors of the
economy-aspects which were long considered to be sources of
strengths for the Southeast Asian tigers-has resulted in less trans-
parency and accountability."
41. See Bergsten, supra note 40, at 1.
42. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, Asian Markets Rebound, Some Up 10% or More,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at D1.
43. Indeed, the primacy of the IMF's role in this crisis was implicitly recog-
nized when Japan's proposal to establish a separate Asia fund, parallel in function
to the IMF, was rejected. The international community agreed that first-line fi-
nancing should be provided by the IMF with second-line financing to be furnished
by Asian nations. See Edward Gargan, Asian Nations Affirm LMF. as Primary
Provider of Aid: Japanese Plan for Separate Fund is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 1997, at D2.
44. See Clay Chandler, Asian Economies: More Myth than Miracle? New
Problems Causing Some of Region's Nations to Rethink Reliance on Japanese
Model, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1997, at Al (noting that "cozy relations" are sus-
ceptible to exploitation by friends and relatives of government officials). Some
commentators have argued that cronyism, nepotism, and rulership through eco-
nomic "combines" not only create non-transparent economic conditions making
such economies vulnerable to unforeseen financial disasters, but that the recent
Asian economic crisis is the region's initiation into the principles of "democratic
capitalism." The term "democratic capitalism" has been defined to mean, "the
combination of a free political society and an open economic system, without con-
trol by government-business conspiracy or partnership." See A.M. Rosenthal, On
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The underregulation of private capital markets in these emerging
markets has also been a systemic problem. 5 In addition, reckless
lending practices and inadequate government supervision has led to
weakened banking sectors in these countries, an open invitation to
financial disaster.46 Although not a final or complete solution, both
Secretary Rubin and the IMF have urged the disclosure of more fi-
nancial information by the governments of these emerging market
economies.47 Indeed, the IMF has proposed an early-warning system
to ward off economic crises. The system is targeted at 23 emerging
capital economies, including Brazil, China, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru,
South Korea, and Thailand, who borrow most heavily from interna-
tional capital markets.48 IMF officials now urge developing nations to
publish periodic financial reports providing accurate information on
inflation, the money supply, and foreign exchange reserves so that
economic warning signs can be detected early.49
The above discussion illustrates the trend in emerging economies
to rely on international capital markets to finance their development
needs. Foreign investment capital, in theory at least, is now available
to most developing nations, with very few exceptions. In order to
be perceived as an "emerging capital market" capable of attracting
equity financing both domestically and internationally, a developing
country must first establish the preconditions of a market economy.
Developing countries must actively create a business climate that
meets the expectations of the foreign investor; such changes have le-
gal as well as economic ramifications. Developing countries are now
considering policy measures and options that differ significantly
from their past decision-making in order to attract foreign investors.
My Mind: Lessons ofthe Asian Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1998, at A25.
45. See Sachs, supra note 3 1, at A23.
46. See Jeff Gerth & Richard Stevenson, Poor Oversight Said to Imperil World
Banking: Tide of Money is Seen as Continuing Threat, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1997,
at Al.
47. See Sanger, supra note 25, at Al; see also IMF Proposes Plan for Early
Warning of Economic Crises, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 1996, at C1 8.
48. See IMF Proposes Plan for Early Warning of Economic Crisis, supra note
47, at C18.
49. See id
50. This discussion will not address the collapsed states of Burundi, Rwanda,
Somalia, or the Sudan, nor the authoritarian regimes of Iran, Iraq, North Korea,
and Serbia. (This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive).
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If, however, their objective is to create stable and sustainable capital
markets, they must contend with fierce competition because the
stakes are so high.
III. THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM
The foregoing discussion was a prelude to introducing to the need
for structural legal reform in developing societies. Although the
phrase "structural legal reform" may connote many different mean-
ings, for purposes of this discussion, the scope of the term is limited
to legal reforms necessary to create and sustain emerging capital
markets in order to attract foreign equity investment. The new
agenda of market integration on a global scale, however, requires a
great deal of commitment to very deep and radical changes. This es-
say proposes three such changes: (1) changing the role of the state,
(2) instituting a Rule of Law regime, and (3) encouraging a process
of democratization within an emerging capital market.
A. REDEFIN[NG THE ROLE OF THE STATE
The first change requires a careful and studied redefinition of the
role of the state in the development process. For the most part, de-
spite the best of intentions, state intervention in the productive sec-
tors of the economy has led to uneven, and sometimes disastrous, re-
sults. When newly independent African, Asian, Caribbean, and Latin
American countries were starting their development process several
decades ago, the state was usually the only creditworthy entity that
had any borrowing or other corporate abilities. However, times have
drastically changed since then.
The state should be encouraged, in most cases, to move out of
manufacturing and other productive sectors of the economy. Elimi-
nating the planned economies of the past, privatizing state-owned in-
dustries, and encouraging domestic capital savings and investment
will facilitate this transition. Additionally, the governments of devel-
oping countries should refocus their attention and resources on regu-
lating markets and facilitating North-South linkages, rather than tak-
ing direct responsibility for economic production. Retrenching the
public sector, however, does not mean that private sector develop-
ment is automatically enhanced. The state, for example, may have to
retool tax codes, enact company law provisions, pass updated bank-
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ruptcy laws, and change the regulatory environment in order to effect
a smooth transition to private sector-led economic growth.
Controlling corruption is another serious problem most developing
states need to confront in this reform process. Corruption not only
distorts and impedes the development process but also repels the
market forces that developing countries are now seeking to attract.
Rooting out corruption may, ultimately, pose the greatest challenge
to developing countries especially after decades of entrenched cor-
ruption. Instilling a sense of economic discipline by eliminating cor-
ruption, however, is a necessary, albeit painful, task.
Despite recent trends, the state has not withered away or faded
from the emerging market scene. The state is still a key player and
should not be overwhelmed by the magnitude and pace of these new
trends in development. Governments should seek to create new part-
nerships with private individuals, non-government organizations, and
international capital markets to form sustainable linkages for the fu-
ture in the areas of technology, trade, and finance. Indeed, the role of
technology in this context cannot be overstated especially since
capital flows are often technology-driven. The challenges facing the
governments of developing countries are both complex and exciting.
B. A RULE OF LAW REGIME
Secondly, developing countries need to implement and institution-
alize a Rule of Law regime. A country should consider the expecta-
tions of the foreign investor and whether it has the means to meet
those expectations. Although the question of conforming to the ex-
pectations of the foreign investor seems harmless enough, it is not.
The "menu" of expectations that a foreign investor has in evaluat-
ing investment opportunities in a particular developing country is
quite predictable. The criteria include: (1) a stable economy that is
relatively free of political disturbances and interference, (2) a freely
convertible currency, (3) repatriable profits, and (4) a legal system
that provides adequate redress for conflicts or disputes. This seems
simple enough, but the apparent simplicity belies the underlying
complexity of these expectations.
To attract the market-driven forces that continue to fuel the proc-
ess of development, host countries must face the challenge of creat-
ing a disciplined business environment. In most developing countries
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in Latin America, Africa, and certain parts of Asia, this may entail, at
the very least, modernizing their existing legal, regulatory, and judi-
cial systems. At its worst, it may necessitate the creation of entirely
new macro-legal systems as in the transitional societies of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union. Most transitional economies
have already instituted a complete overhaul of their property and
commercial laws since the underlying idea of capitalism rests on the
individual's right to own private property. In addition, these coun-
tries have drafted and passed laws in support of a new macro-legal
framework in areas such as contract, bankruptcy, trade, intellectual
property rights, banking, taxation, foreign investment, securities and
commodities, labor, the environment, and international dispute set-
tlement. Further, transitional economies are also creating regulatory
schemes and appropriate enforcement mechanisms in support of
newly passed laws.
Both developing and transitional economies need to ensure that
they have a well-educated and independent judiciary able to interpret
and enforce new laws which are enacted to support the needs of a
market-driven economy. To that end, the curricula of local law
schools may need to change in order to conform to the new legal in-
frastructure that such governments have put in place.
Building a Rule of Law regime is a truly daunting task and one
that is being undertaken without the careful planning that should ac-
company legal reforms. Most importantly, many reforms are being
implemented in a haphazard fashion without the benefit of legal his-
tory to support these changes. The common law concepts behind the
ideas of private property, contracts, and corporate law are complex
and stem from the historical experience of the West from the transi-
tion of feudalism to mercantile capitalism to more advanced forms of
capitalism. These historical transitions occurred over the course of
several centuries, not over the course of several years. Therefore, the
legislation that is being enacted wholesale by certain transitional
economies lacks a historical grounding.
Moreover, in certain instances, importing the legal concepts and
the legal institutional framework of the West to attract investment
capital may not serve developing countries well. The legal concepts
being introduced in Mongolia, for example, in response to the need
for antitrust laws to avoid the formation of private monopolies during
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the process of privatization, may not fit into Mongolia's existing le-
gal framework and may thereby create the possibility for confusion
and uncertainty. In the immediate future, there is bound to be a cer-
tain degree of confusion, but in the long-term analysis, do these
countries have any other viable choice but to institute these structural
legal reforms?
Although the idea of adopting Western forms of legal thought and
institutions may seem logical and has often been identified by legal
experts as an impediment to progress, at what cost does this transi-
tion take place? The cost may be unexpectedly high, especially when
indigenous or traditional forms of legal thought and governance are
sacrificed in the process. A developing country's own legal concep-
tual framework, legal history, and institutions may lose their authen-
ticity in this process, and that loss could be permanent. If the idea of
global integration includes the complete transformation of the devel-
oping world's legal systems to conform with the legal constructs of
the West, this trend should cause us some sense of misgiving.
Most of the developing world is already fraught with overriding
conflicts of laws, especially where traditional or indigenous forms of
legal institutions are pitted against "received" forms of Western legal
traditions, a colonial legacy of the developing world. The new de-
mands of becoming an emerging capital market are now being su-
perimposed on this underlying tension. This has led to a great deal of
uncertainty and conflict over whether a developing country should
change the legal infrastructure and, if so, how and when? Should de-
veloping countries address the inherent contradictions in their present
legal systems before attempting to incorporate a system of even more
complex and alien laws to appease a foreign investor in search of an
attractive investment opportunity?
These questions are not easy to answer. Perhaps more disturbingly,
however, it is not clear that such questions are being asked by devel-
oping countries, or by Western legal experts, in the first place. In the
drive to become an emerging capital market and attract foreign capi-
tal investment, many developing countries are instituting a new Rule
of Law regime. As laudable as their intentions may be, the true na-
ture of what may be sacrificed in this process should not be totally
disregarded. By eliminating traditional legal customs, practices, and
laws, these countries risk losing a vital part of their legal history and
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culture. Developing countries should balance these trade-offs care-
fully. This balancing act is made even more difficult since competi-
tion for new capital investment is fierce. Thus, emerging capital
markets face the possibility that if they do not integrate successfully
into the global market, their entire development process may be
jeopardized. Many developing countries are discovering that an im-
portant part of their legal identity may be lost along the way.
C. ENCOURAGING DEMOCRATIZATION
Finally, developing countries are also reconsidering the question
of democratization. Why is democratization so often linked to the
question of development in the first place? In terms of international
global markets, any kind of risk, including political risk, affects the
viability of foreign investment in that economy. Therefore, develop-
ing countries need to minimize political risks to protect such invest-
ments. The host government needs to assure foreign investors that
the country is stable, transparent, and not subject to military coups or
violent overthrows. Essentially, foreign investors want to know that
the host government will honor their commitments and institute
agreed-upon economic and other reforms. Of course, in some coun-
tries, such as India and many parts of Africa, democratic institutions
have been a vibrant and intrinsic part of the fabric of civil society,
and no transition to democracy is necessary.
On a more philosophical level, democratization puts the individual
on center stage as the sole actor and arbiter of his or her political life.
Asserting one's economic liberty and political freedom permits the
expression of one's free will, be it in the marketplace or in the poll-
ing booth. The power of choice and the centrality of the individual
within the development process is thus secured. For most of the de-
veloping world, however, the individual is not at the center of any
universe, either socially or politically. The interests, needs, and ex-
pressions of the individual are subsumed within the larger context of
family, community, or ethnic/religious group. The idea of putting the
individual at the center of the development process-whether it is
economic, political, or legal change-may be difficult in some de-
veloping societies. It is, nevertheless, a concept that developing so-





The foregoing discussion links the ideas of structural, economic,
and legal reform and the democratic means of governance in a dy-
namic continuum. Macro-economic reform along with macro-legal
change must go hand in hand with greater democratic freedoms if the
individual is to express both his or her political and economic will. It
is important to remember, however, what is being sacrificed along
the way.
Achieving sustainable development is a challenging proposition
and is successful when the benefits are balanced against the required
sacrifices. When too much is sacrificed too quickly in order to
achieve a Western-imposed ideal of economic prosperity, the devel-
opment equation will ultimately collapse. A developing country
needs to make some shrewd calculations concerning the quid pro
quo, so to speak, of development.
To make development within a society lasting and truly meaning-
ful, progress must reflect the individual ideals and aspirations of all
its peoples. That is a complex challenge, but there is a role for all of
us to play in bringing about full and participatory development. We
all have a vital part and a vital stake in welcoming the new millen-
nium.
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